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A B S T R A C T

Despite developments in the prevention of fatalities in the construction industry, fatalities resulting from well-known hazards continue at an unacceptable rate.
Construction fatality prevention literature describes risk management techniques to provide ‘early warning’ of potential events. In dynamic construction project
environments, these ‘early warnings’ are missed resulting in serious and fatal events. Critical Control Risk Management (CCRM) provides an alternative strategy to
prevent fatal events in the construction industry. However, no research exists that explores the application of CCRM to actual construction projects. This study aims to
design, develop, and validate a construction fatality prevention program using CCRM principles through mixed method research. A six-phase fatality prevention
process, the Major Accident Prevention (‘MAP’) program was developed and validated over 18 months on an Australian construction project. The MAP program
provided a practical approach to risk management which significantly enhanced frontline risk management practices. Modelling of performance indicators identified
first aid injuries and hazard reporting were the most significant measures which correlated with supervisor observations, and personal risk assessments MAP ac
tivities. A weak correlation between MAP activities and first aid injuries was identified (0.528p = <0.05) with further statistical analysis limited by the small sample
size. A key attribute of the MAP program was the risk profiling planning tool which provided a four week look ahead on the fatal risks, allowing management to focus
effort on verifying relevant critical controls in the field. The findings of this study aim to help construction organizations develop and implement fatal risk prevention
programs.

1. Introduction
The construction industry fatality incidence rate (fatalities per
100,000 workers) is the second highest in Australia after Agriculture,
Fishing and Forestry (Safe Work Australia 2020) and is similarly ranked
in other developed nations including USA, UK and Singapore.1 Safe
Work Australia (2020) reported over 90 % of fatalities are one or two
person events from common high-risk activities with known hazards and
known controls Table 1.
Research into accident prevention has identified multiple factors and
safety controls to prevent incidents from occurring (Zhang et al. 2019;
Mohammadi, Tavakolan, and Khosravi 2018; Bellamy 2015). Con
struction specific studies have analysed incidents to identify causation
factors (S. Chi et al. 2015; Betsis et al. 2019; Winge, Albrechtsen, and
Mostue 2019), the mechanisms of energy release (Chi et al. 2009) and
factors influencing fatality prevention including leadership, risk

management, and safety climate (Alarcón et al. 2016). However, con
struction fatalities from foreseeable events with known controls still
occur across the industry.
The identification of hazards with potential for a fatality (i.e., major
hazards) arising from the foreseeable events are understood within the
construction industry as evident in a variety of fatality prevention pro
grams (e.g., Life Saving Rules which prescribe a series of behavioural
expectations to minimise fatality risk from foreseeable events). For these
events, preventative controls have also been defined in standards and
codes of practice in Australia and internationally.2 Regulators have
published detailed safety standards on construction high-risk activities,
and defined the controls to be applied to prevent and mitigate conse
quences which lead to fatalities (Safe Work Australia 2020). Although
the hazards and controls associated with the construction high risk ac
tivities are well-known, incident investigations continue to identify
controls that were either not implemented or the performance of the
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on or attend to the critical controls.
In CCRM, rule-based criteria for Critical Controls are defined,
enabling line management and their team members to consistently
interpret and apply controls. This somewhat removes the subjectivity of
individuals’ decision making regarding the expected controls (Interna
tional Council for Metals and Mining (ICMM), 2015).
CCRM has been adopted by the mining industry where it has helped
to reduce injuries and fatalities (Rio Tinto, 2021). However, there is no
equivalent program in the construction industry. For a CCRM based
program to be adopted by construction organizations, it needs to be
capable of functioning in the dynamic work environment, including a
constantly changing workforce, which is not generally seen in a mining
environment.

Table 1
Risk Profile of construction fatal event causation.
Event Predictability
(Event Consequence)

Foreseeable events with known
controls

Catastrophic (multiple fatalities)

Natural events:
cyclone, bushfire, flooding
Design:
engineering faults, design failures
Task specific events:
Fall from Working at Height
Dropped Object
Caught between objects
Working in Confined Space
Vehicle interactions
• Slip, trip, fall at same level
Muscle overuse / over exertion

Critical (single / two-person fatality
events)

Non-fatal injury/illness events (less than
fatal)

1.2. Risk management in construction currently

control was inadequate (Dodshon and Hassall 2017; Bellamy 2015;
Lingard et al. 2021). A better understanding of the reasons why the
controls are unreliable is required when considering alternative risk
control strategies.
Hopkins (2011) suggests risk is a continuum and humans perception
of risk varies according to their experience, risk tolerance and other
factors including perceived or real production pressure. In practice the
fatality risk reduction action an individual takes following the identifi
cation of a hazard is based on their personal perception of risk, even if it
differs from the expectation of their employer (Hayes, 2012).
In high-risk industries, the ambiguity of individual risk perceptions
and required action is reduced through rules with detailed specifications
which converts the risk into a dichotomy for the purpose of decisionmaking, that is the risk is acceptable or not-acceptable (Hopkins
2011). It is the combination of risk management (i.e., to consistently
identify major accident risks and controls) and rule compliance
(implementation of controls) which should provide a more sustainable
approach for preventing reoccurring major accident events. Hayes
(2012) expanded this in an analysis of three organisations operating in
rule-based, goal setting safety regulatory environments. Where controls
[rules] had specified tolerance limits managers were more likely to act
and intervene when controls deviated from the limits even when under
production pressure.
Our review, Selleck and Cattani (Selleck and Cattani, 2019),
concluded that the construction industry “would benefit by adopting a
shift in focus from risk assessment and the associated bureaucracy, to
risk treatment with a focus on control reliability and effectiveness to
prevent the ongoing occurrence of fatality events across the industry”.
We recommended exploring whether the Critical Control Risk Man
agement (CCRM) process could be adapted to construction in a manner
that improves the management of fatality risks. In this paper we explore
whether CCRM can be adapted to a construction work environment and
improve project safety performance.

Risk management in construction, and all industries which use
“ISO31000: 2018 Risk Management – Guidelines” rely on hazard
assessment processes to manage safety risks. In brief, when hazards are
identified, a risk assessment is conducted (I.e. the likelihood of a pre
dicted consequence occurring) (International Standardization Organi
zation (ISO) 2018). The risk assessment is used to inform an evaluation
of the risk, either as subjective rating (I.e., low to very high) or as
calculated rates of failure based on incident data, which is used pre
dominantly for process safety applications (e.g., safety cases for major
hazard facilities). The risk assessment rating provides relativity between
risks and is relied upon by senior leaders to make decisions on the effort
and resources required to manage the risk, a fundamental concept of the
“risk management framework” (International Organisation for Stan
dardization, 2018). The rating is used to determine if risk treatment is
required and if so, then the controls to be implemented are identified.
The construction industry risk management process is applied as
“layers” where hazard assessment and control are used at increasing
levels of detail, from project wide to task level activities. The intent is
that at each level, the risk of each activity is managed to an acceptable
level (Hallowell and Gambates 2009). An underlying assumption of the
layered risk management process and hazard assessments is that defined
controls, including human actions, are consistently implemented
throughout the construction activities. Construction research has iden
tified that reliance on these human factor practices in current risk
management systems produces variable levels of control due to human
factors. Human factors affect hazard identification, risk control imple
mentation and the effectiveness of the layered risk management systems
(Selleck and Cattani, 2019). Albert and Pandit (2020a) demonstrated
workers are more likely to identify hazards which impose greater safety
risk, indicating workers have a heightened level of recognition of fatal
risks, but there is work to do to enhance this process as fatal events are
still occurring.
To address the risk of fatality events, the construction industry riskbased approach needs to:

1.1. CCRM and potential use in construction

1. reduce human error associated with hazard identification;
2. reduce complexity of the layered risk management process by
focussing on risk treatment (I.e., controls);
3. improve the specification of controls to enable consistent decision
making on the implementation and effectiveness of controls; and
4. be resilient to the dynamic construction environment as changes in
the risk profile occur throughout the project lifecycle.

CCRM is a defence in depth risk management approach enhanced by
High Reliability Organisation (HRO) theory to focus human effort in
complex socio-technical systems on the critical elements that prevent
fatalities. CCRM applies bow-tie analysis to identify the threat pathways
and multiple controls (i.e., defence in depth) to prevent unwanted
events and to mitigate their consequences (International Council on
Mining and Metals (ICMM) 2015b). CCRM shifts the focus from risk
assessment to risk control. CCRM identifies the critical controls that are
crucial in preventing fatalities and that need an enhanced level of
attention to ensure they are implemented and effective. HRO theory is
based on being sensitive to operations, preoccupied with failure,
mindfulness, and where the premise is maintaining a constant state of
mind that operations that are ‘safe’ or could go ‘unsafe’ (Weick Karl and
Sutcliffe, 2007) which describes how all organisation levels should focus

The ICMM CCRM concept provides a methodology to determine
construction critical controls and outlines processes supporting imple
mentation within an organisation (International Council for Metals and
Mining (ICMM), 2015b, International Council on Mining and Metals
(ICMM), 2015a). The adaptation of the ICMM methodology within a
construction organization potentially achieves point 1 to 3 above.
However, it is unclear how to address consistent application in the
2
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dynamic construction work environment with the constantly changing
risk profile through a project lifecycle (point 4). No research literature
could be found that explores the application of the CCRM approach to
actual construction projects.
To address this gap, this paper presents the novel research that de
scribes the development and validation of a fatality prevention model
which combines the risk-based approach focussed on control effective
ness and principles of HRO to address the common mechanisms of
construction fatality events.

• Section 3.1: Development of a construction critical control risk
management model
• Section 3.2: Design and development of the MAP program with
supporting risk-based tools
• Section 3:3: Pilot study to validate the MAP program on a con
struction project
• Section 3.4: Statistical analysis of safety leading and lagging in
dicators to evaluate the impact of MAP on safety performance
The structure and sequence of the research is outlined in Fig. 1 and
summarized in Table 2. The initial phase included the design and
development of the risk-based processes and tools to support field
execution of critical control risk management. This was iterative
throughout the development of the bow-ties and alignment on controls.

2. Aim and objectives
The project aim was to validate a novel risk-based process to reduce
the risk of construction site fatalities by considering and answering the
improvements identified from previous studies and reviews (Selleck and
Cattani, 2019; Albert and Pandit 2020a).
With the working name the Major Accident Prevention (MAP) pro
gram the objectives of the project were:

Table 2
Summary of research methodology by phase.

• Define a risk-based model to assist the management of construction
fatality risk reduction.
• Describe and validate the steps required to implement the model on a
construction site consistently throughout the project lifecycle.
• Conduct a pilot study to evaluate the performance of the new model
relative to existing risk management processes and the human fac
tors which contribute to the failure of controls.
• Conduct statistical evaluation of the potential impact on incident
performance.

Research Phase

Steps

Relevant Section

Design and
development of
MAP program

Bow-tie risk workshops

Section 3.2.1,
Appendix A,
Appendix B,
Appendix C
Section 3.2.2
Section 3.2.3,
Appendix D
Section 3.2.4 and
3.2.5, Appendix E

Organisational Principles
Project Risk Profile

3. Methodology
The research applied a multi-step methodology to develop the new
risk-based program and to test the program on a construction project.
The research was conducted in four phases:

Pilot Study –
validation of MAP
processes

Supervisor / Team Critical
Control Verification &
Competency
Measuring MAP Performance
Trial of MAP on Pilot Project and
feedback to improve MAP
processes

Measuring MAP
impact on safety
performance

Statistical measurement and
analysis of MAP contribution to
Pilot Project safety performance.

Fig. 1. Research framework by phase.
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This phase also included the organisational and competency factors to
implement MAP on a project. The pilot study tested the MAP processes,
training, and use of field critical control verifications. The third phase
was the post implementation statistical analysis to explore MAPs
contribution to safety performance.

3.2. MAP program design, development and tools
3.2.1. Defining construction critical control standards
The initial step (1) of the MAP model requires a detailed under
standing of the type of major accident events (i.e., single, or multiple
fatality) and the Critical Controls Standards (i.e., define this term) which
prevent the unplanned release of energy with the potential to cause a
fatality. The detail and specification of the Major Accident Events
(MAEs) and Critical Controls form the basis for field verification (Step 4)
to validate if the controls are implemented and effective. The MAP
model definitions for terms used and examples are provided in Table 3.
To gain the detailed understanding, a panel of construction experts
were nominated by the participating organisations to provide a mix of
construction expertise (i.e., construction, commissioning managers,
safety engineer, earthwork, civil, mechanical, electrical, instrument
supervisors and safety advisors) each having a minimum of 15 years’
experience, with the panel having an overall average of 23.2 years of
experience. The panel conducted bow-tie analysis following the

3.1. Major Accident prevention model
The Major Accident Prevention (MAP) program was developed by
adapting the safety case and the ICMM (2015b) CCRM models to
manage known personal safety fatalities experienced in the construction
industry. The MAP program builds on the process outlined in the ICMM
(2015a) bow-tie methodology to produce a system design which ad
dresses both the dynamic risks experienced throughout the construction
project lifecycle and the critical control standards. The MAP program
(Fig. 2) is a cyclic system which identifies and applies Critical Control
(CC) verification, monitors CC performance and provides feedback on
improvements to the CCs throughout a project.
The MAP program was designed to be applied on any construction
project. The first two steps define the Critical Control standards and
determine the verification checks required as part of the monthly project
schedule. Steps 3 and 4 are supervisor-based verification of controls in
the field ensuring the competency to conduct verifications is maintained
through Step 5 monitoring. Any gaps in Critical Controls either not being
implemented or not up to standard are reviewed in Step 6 and action
taken to address the gaps.
The development of MAP involved a high level of engagement with
construction industry personnel to ensure Critical Controls (i.e. those
controls designed to prevent fatalities or ‘CCs’) are practical, provide
specific criteria to enable consistent decision making and can be adapted
to multiple high-risk work activities (Selleck and Cattani, 2019).
To support the practical application, and engage construction man
agement and front-line leaders, an action research methodology was
applied to both the design of the Major Accident Prevention (MAP)
program and facilitating the case study implementation. Action research
method was chosen because as Coghlan and Shani (2014) observed an
insider action research capability can be used to: “ 1) study and shape
new opportunities and threats, 2) to empower decision-makers to seize
opportunities and 3) to sustain the organization’s success….”. Action
research enabled organisational factors affecting risk maturity, decision
making, risk tolerance, compliance to CCs and safety climate were
considered and managed through the design and implementation pro
cesses to engage in the program.

Table 3
MAP model terms and definitions.
Term

Definition

Activities
Consequence

Work scopes undertaken during construction projects
Unplanned outcomes from escalation of event (post energy
release) – specifically single or multiple fatality or
disabling injury
Human action, system or object which prevents unplanned
event or mitigates escalation of consequences
(as per ICMM (2015b) definition)
Is the control a human act, object, or system? and
Does it directly prevent the release of hazardous energy or
mitigate the consequences? or
Is the control performance, specifiable, observable,
measurable and auditable?
The release of energy through an unplanned event which
has the potential to result in a single or multiple fatality or
disabling injury from foreseeable events with known
controls.
The mechanism by which the hazardous energy is released
causing an MAE. (Importantly, a threat is not a failed
control).
e.g., Platform failure

Controls
Critical Control

Major Accident Event
(MAE)
Major Accident Event
Hazard
(Threat)
MAE Category

Grouping of common MAE Scenarios – e.g. Working at
Height

Fig. 2. Construction industry - major accident prevention model.
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methodology detailed in ICMM (2015b) through a series of bow-tie risk
assessment workshops averaging 4 h duration. Development of the bowties comprised three sub-processes: i) defining construction MAEs,
including threats and consequences, ii) identifying controls for each
threat / consequence pathway and iii) determining Critical Controls.
Defining MAEs and Controls.
For each MAE the panel identified threats, controls and conse
quences for construction fatality events with MAEs categorised in
accordance with existing life-saving rules as the risk to be analysed
(International Association of Oil Gas Producers (OGP), 2012; Safer
Together 2016) and mechanism of fatal incidents as threats (Safe Work
Australia, 2018a; Chi et al. 2015). The threats and consequences were
described as the mechanism by which the ‘energy’ was released, or
consequence occurred (e.g., fell through roof or person struck by falling
object). A sample of five diverse construction project schedules (i.e.,
process plant, near shore structures, offshore oil and gas facility hook up,
water treatment plant, power station, civil infrastructure) were used to
identify the mechanisms of fatal events (threats). The panel analyzed the
project schedules and identified the standard scope of common con
struction activities (Appendix A), providing common definitions for use
in the MAE bow-tie analysis. From the activities the panel identified
potentially fatal events which were grouped into categories (Appendix
B) that then formed the basis for the MAE bow-tie analysis.
For each MAE a bow-tie risk analysis was developed by the panel
which included:

operations) not being associated with the work scope being undertaken
on the project or ii) Specific MAE scenarios are not always present
during construction activities (e.g., pressure testing). The panel pro
posed the design of the Project MAP Risk Profile (Section 3.2.3) as a
method to address these limitations.
Design of MAP Verification Checklists.
The use of safety checklists provides a systematic method for appli
cation by workers and reduces errors due to oversight (Hopkins 2011;
Hale and Borys 2013) or gaps in hazard recognition (Albert et al.
2020b); (Carter and Smith 2006; Bahn 2013). Clear, concise, and rele
vant rules in the form of a checklist provide a structured method to test
critical controls in the workplace. The acceptance and adherence to the
Critical Controls practices and application of the checklists by the su
pervisors and workforce is determined by their safety attitude (Loose
more and Malouf 2019; Langford et al. 2000), which is shaped by the
emotional and cognitive engagement of workforce applying the safety
practice (Rich, et al. 2010; Wachter and Yorio 2014).
The objective in designing the MAP Checklists was to translate the
Critical Control ‘rule’ statements into a format that can be applied by
line supervision in the field, evoke emotional engagement of the work
force, provide context of importance. A standard MAP Checklist was
developed for each MAE Category for use on relevant construction ac
tivities. The MAP Checks were drafted as objective [outcome] based
standards to be achieved without specifying the ‘method’ avoiding the
pitfalls Dekker (2014) recognized which constrain cognitive solutions or
innovation in response to dynamic construction environments. The MAP
Checklists convert the Critical Controls identified through the MAE bowtie risk analysis into field verification activities against specified control
standards.
In discussion with the MAE panel of experts the MAP Checklists
included the ‘cause and effect’ pathways with preventative and miti
gative controls. The MAP Checklist primary feature was the bowtie
visualization which documented the threat pathways with the specified
control statements easily interpreted – defining what was important.
The second feature was summarizing analogue (serious injury / fatality)
events providing description of previous events, causes and application
of critical controls – defining ‘why’ critical controls are important. The
third feature was guidance on ‘how’ supervisors could verify the critical
controls were implemented and effective in the field – how to be
effective when conducting the MAP Check verifications an example of a
MAP Check is provided in Appendix E.
The MAP checklists were implemented in the pilot project (Section
3.3) and revised based on interactive feedback with supervisors during
coaching sessions or the MAP check review workshops.

i. defining the construction MAE from the list shown in Appendix B
ii. identifying controls for each threat / consequence pathway using
bowtie analysis (an example shown in Appendix C) and
iii. determining Critical Controls (which were highlighted on bow
ties shown in Appendix C).
The MAE Scenarios were confirmed from a review of fatal incident
reports as detailed in regulator databases (Safe Work Australia – fatal
incident reports, NIOSH FACE database). The scenarios identified had at
least one fatal incident reported in the previous ten years. A total of 10
MAE Categories, 39 MAE Scenarios (Appendix B) were developed. A
bow-tie analysis was conducted on each of the 10 MAE Categories with
the associated MAE Scenarios being used to help form the ‘threats’ on
the left of the bow-tie then further analysis was don’t to identify controls
as discussed next.
Once the bow-tie threats and consequences were identified,
researcher (first author) using the industry body of knowledge of con
trols (Safe Work Australia 2015, Safe Work Australia, 2018a; Commis
sion for Occupational Health and Safety (WA), 2004; Safe Work
Australia 2021) added the control statements to generate the bowties in
the format presented in Appendix C.
The bowties with all controls were presented back to the panel of
experts who individually assessed if all the MAE’s had been identified,
the validity of the controls that had been included and if any were
missing. Each bowtie was amended based on consensus to include new
controls, amended control statements or to re-assign controls to threat or
consequence pathways. Then the panel of experts determined which
were the critical controls.
Identifying Threat / Consequence Critical Controls.
‘Critical controls’ were determined based on criteria adapted from
Hassall et al., (2015) and International Council for Metals and Mining
(ICMM), (2015b). Where ‘critical controls’ were defined within an event
category (e.g., falling from a height) and the critical controls addressed
more than one threat then the threats were combined. The identified
MAE categories (10), fatal hazard scenarios (39) and critical control
statements were used in the development of the Risk Profile tool. A total
of 312 critical controls were identified across the 39 fatal hazard sce
narios. An example bow tie is provided in Appendix C.
The MAE panel regularly discussed the limitations of applying 312
critical controls to a project due to i) A MAE Category (e.g., marine

3.2.2. Defining organisational principles for implementation of the MAP
program
A two-hour engagement workshop was held with Senior Manage
ment (CEO, Executive Management Team, and Project Manager from
pilot project) to understand their perception of risk and obtain
consensus on implementation principles. Questions on who owns the
fatality risk; can it be delegated and how; what ALARP is (i.e., number
critical control required); how frequently should MAP checks be
completed; and were exceptions allowed, were discussed and used to
form the principles and used to design the implementation plan of the
pilot program.
The engagement workshops resulted in the MAP Principles which
would subsequently be used in the implementation of MAP in the field
and incorporated into the MAP training:
• Fatality Risks and therefore MAP and CCs are owned by the CEO who
remains accountable however responsibility to ensure MAP is oper
ating is delegated to General Operating Managers and Project
Managers

5
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consisting of subject matter experts (construction & commissioning
managers, safety engineer, earthwork, civil, mechanical, electrical, in
strument supervisors and safety advisors) systematically assessed each
scope of work to:

• MAP is an operational leader responsibility with MAP checks to be
conducted by site supervision who directly control high risk work
tasks.
• Stop Work is mandatory where a CC is identified as not being
implemented – a CC directly prevents release of fatal energy so in the
absence of the CC a fatal potentially will occur.
• Deviation from a defined CC is not acceptable without prior autho
rization from General Operating Manager.
• MAP is an assurance program requiring MAP Checks to be completed
for each MAE Hazard present on a project every month. (i.e., 20
MAE’s identified on Risk Profile = minimum of 20 MAP Checks).

I. identify which MAE applied to the work package; and
II. consolidate third level construction work scopes into clearly defined
Construction Activities (Appendix B).
The result was a consolidated matrix of ten Construction Activities
mapped to 40 identified MAE hazard scenarios (Appendix D). The Risk
Profile was tested across five active projects where the project manager,
construction and engineering manager and safety advisor assessed the
project’s current work activities using the matrix to identify the MAE’s
applicable to existing work scopes. Feedback from the project review
identified clear concise Construction Activity definitions were required
to support the Risk Profile (Appendix D).

Project management and safety professionals are responsible for
ensuring the quality of MAP checks is maintained.
3.2.3. Developing the project risk Profile
Defining the Project Risk Profile.
Construction risks change throughout the project lifecycle as the
work activities move from earthworks, through the installation of
footings and foundations in preparation for steelwork and piping
installation prior to fitting electrical, instrumentation and control sys
tems of the facility. Pre-commissioning and commissioning activities
further change the project risk as systems are energized whilst plant and
infrastructure are still being installed (Fig. 3). The workforce which
undertakes these various stages of construction also change regularly as
the trades and skills required transition through the project. Therefore,
the workforce is in a frequent state of change, as crews mobilize and
demobilize as each work scope is executed (Fig. 3).
The MAP model considers how to consistently apply Critical Control
verifications which were relevant to the construction activities
throughout the project lifecycle.
The MAP model applies a Project Risk Profile Matrix to define the
specific MAEs and hazards which need to be addressed at a point in time
during the project lifecycle in response to the dynamic construction
environment.
The Risk Profile has two components, MAE hazard scenarios and
Activities (construction scopes of work) which are presented as a matrix
and mapped based on the project contract scope of work. A sample of ten
diverse construction projects (i.e., jetty, material offload facilities,
offshore hookup & commissioning, infrastructure bridges / rail, power
station, water processing & dam refurbishment, gas / chemical plants)
from 3 companies were selected and using the third level construction
schedule collated the work activities for MAE assessment. A group

3.2.4. Design of supervisor and team critical control verification
competence
The target audience for MAP is the line management (project and
construction managers) and direct supervision (construction superin
tendents, supervisors / foreman) as they control the work practices. The
design of the training and competency program considered project,
organizational, practical, and motivational factors which reduce the
effectiveness of training (Tezel et al. 2021). Supervision and workers
were trained and coached to be in the application of the critical control’s
verifications. The training sessions were experiential using case studies
in team groups and included in field MAP check verifications in facili
tated coaching to improve understanding and transference of theoretical
learning into practice (Demirkesen and Arditi 2015). A series of opera
tional tools were developed to train personnel and monitor the effec
tiveness of the controls:
• Training – a 2.5-hour theory session on MAP program, context for
MAP (fundamental rules) and how to apply the MAP verification
checks and assurance reviews.
• MAE Hazard Verification Checklists (MAP Checks) – checklists
comprising i) MAE Bowtie including hazard, preventative and miti
gative CC’s (what it is being checked); ii) Analogous incidents –
synopsis of similar historic fatality events (why is the MAE impor
tant) and iii) verification checklist (guidance on how to conduct the
CC verification).

Fig. 3. Construction project life cycle – post mobilisation (Adapted from (Luo et al. 2017)).
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• MAE Hazard Assurance Reviews (MAP Assurance) – process for
conducting and recording the MAP assurance using completed MAP
checks.

for the next time to verification was conducted.
3.3. Pilot study

Feedback on the training program was sought through feedback
forms and discussion with participants during training sessions whilst
conducting the case study. The feedback was used to define the MAP
Check Principles (Section 3.2.5).

To validate the 6 step MAP program a Pilot Study was conducted to:
• Test and verify the MAP tools (MAP Risk Profile, MAP Verification
Checklists) on a project across different work scopes
• Implement MAP alignment sessions and training to refine the
training requirements and material
• Explore the contribution MAP has on the safety performance of the
project and the relationship with other risk assessment practices.

3.2.5. Field verification and MAP check principles
Field verification was designed to be conducted by Supervisors of
work crews undertaking high risk activities. Supervisors know the work
methods, understand the hazards and are in the field enabling ‘imme
diate’ action to stop work when controls are not implemented or
effective.
The ‘stop work’ assumption is known to be impacted by organisation
factors affecting supervisor decision to stop work, including lack of
clarity in the control specifications, deferring the stop work decision as it
would not be supported by senior management (Hayes, 2012) normal
isation of known hazards and risks (Reason 2016). To counter these
factors the following foundation principles for MAP checks were
defined:

The MAP program pilot implementation was conducted at an
Australian construction site managed by a global construction company
(Table 4). The pilot program commenced 4 weeks prior to site mobili
zation with the MAP risk profile workshop (Step 2), and training (Step 3)
commencing 1 week after mobilization. Field verification (Step 4)
commenced 4 weeks after supervisors were competent in the CC veri
fication process.
The Pilot Study ran for eighteen months, finishing prior to the start of
pre-commissioning works.

• Stop Work is mandatory, supervisors are authorized and obligated
to stop work where a CC is identified as not being implemented or
effective.
• MAP Checks were limited to a monthly assurance frequency – one
verification of each MAE Hazard applicable to the project during the
month as a minimum to ensure Critical Control standard were
maintained, whilst minimizing complacency due to normalization of
risk by supervisors.

3.4. Measuring MAP contribution to safety performance – data analysis
Application of the MAP program was in addition to existing risk
assessment and hazard management practices.
The relationship between MAP and existing risk practices was
explored to understand the potential contribution MAP had in pre
venting incident events. The lead and lag variables (Table 5) were
normalized by adapting Salas and Hallowell (2016) hours worked
metric. Normalisation of data is important to manage the risk of
comparing data with different units (Sallas and Hallowell 2016).
The data was analysed using R statistical package (R Core Team
2020) applying exploratory analysis steps to understand the relation
ships and strength of relationships between variables (Hyndman and
Athanasopoulos 2018). Exploration of the data was conducted using
correlations between the variables, principal component analysis (PCA)
applied across the safety performance variables listed in Table 5.
The time series variables were tested for stationarity using the
Kwiatkowsski, Phillips, Schmidt & Shin (KPPS) test. Non-stational data
needs to be transformed prior to conducting regression analysis or
modelling to avoid spurious results being generated (Hyndman and
Athanasopoulos 2018). Logarithmic and average mean differences
transformation processes were applied to the data and retested for
stationarity.

Communication of the MAP Check Principles was incorporated into
the MAP implementation process in the senior management alignment
workshop and project specific training program.
3.2.6. Measuring MAP performance
Monitoring –Performance Measurements.
The MAP program manages fatality risk through the application of
risk planning processes and the verification of identified CC’s. CC per
formance is characterised by the reliability of the control, i.e. the degree
to which the CC is implemented and effective (Hassall et al., 2015). The
performance measures for MAP were selected to monitor risk planning,
application of verification process and the results of the CC verifications.
A system of collecting and collating data to monitor the following
performance indicators was applied:
• Risk planning: - completion of monthly MAP Risk Profile
• Participation rates:
o Planned MAP checks versus actual conducted in the period
(weekly)
o Planned MAP assurance reviews versus actual conducted in the
period (weekly)
• Risk exposure: Critical controls failure rate – number of controls
failed / controls applied

4. Results
4.1. Step 1 & 2: Defining project critical controls through the risk profile
The pilot study conducted the Risk Profile workshop to determine
Table 4
Project details.

Lessons Learned.
Where a CC “failed” either through not being implemented, or when
implemented not effective in preventing the potentially fatal energy
being released, the construction panel reviewed the relevant MAE Bow
Tie and either improved the Critical Control specification or added a
Critical Control if there was a gap in the threat pathways. The amended
Critical Controls were then validated through field testing. This feed
back continuous improvement process was termed “Lessons Learned”
and it ensured the identified improvements were updated in the CC
verification checklists and re-issued for use, which locked in the changes

Project
Parameters

Details

Location
Scope

Perth - Western Australia
Infrastructure: all process and ancillary buildings
Process plant: wastewater treatment facility, bore field,
pipelines, discharge lines
Design, Procure, Construct & Commission
Joint Venture Principal Contractor – self perform with specialist
sub-contractors
634,700 with 220 persons on site at peak
Total: 32 months. On site: 20 months

Contract Model
Contract
Structure
Workhours
Duration
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ciated with the high-risk activities and overall number of active work
fronts (Fig. 4). For example, the increase in May 2018 in the WAH
(Working at Heights) was due to the facility building roofing task,
resulting in additional MAP checks.

Table 5
Safety performance leading and lagging metrics and variables.
Proactive
Metric

Code

Measurement

Variable
type

Total
recordable
incident rate

TRIR

Response

Restricted
Duties
incident rate

RDIF

First Aid Injury
rate

FAI_FR

All injury
incident rate

ALLINJ_FR

No treatment
injury rate

NO_TREAT_FR

All incident rate

ALLINC_FR

Supervisor
Observation

SOI-FR

Stop Work
Authority

SWA_FR

Hazard Report

HAZREP_FR

Personal Risk
Assessment

PRA_FR

MAP Check
Rate

MAPCH

MAP Assurance
Rate

MAPAs

Multiplying the number of
recordable injuries in a month
by 200,000 / hours worked in
the month
Multiplying the number of
restricted duties injuries in a
month by 200,000 / hours
worked in the month
Multiplying the number of
first aid injuries in a month by
200,000 / hours worked in
the month
Multiplying the total number
of injuries in a month by
200,000 / hours worked in
the month
Multiplying the total number
of no treatment injuries in a
month by 200,000 / hours
worked in the month
Multiplying the number of
incident events in a month by
200,000 / hours worked in
the month
Multiplying the number of
Supervisor observation &
interventions by 200,000 /
hours working in a month
Multiplying the number of
Stop Work Authority events
by 200,000 / hours working
in a month
Multiplying the number of
Hazard reports by 200,000 /
hours working in a month
Multiplying the number of
personal risk assessments by
200,000 / hours working in a
month
Multiplying the number of
MAP Checks by 200,000 /
hours working in a month
Multiplying the number of
MAP Assurance reviews by
200,000 / hours working in a
month

4.2. Step 3: Supervisor competency
The project implementation was conducted across 18 months, and
included 10 training sessions for supervisors, 3 senior leadership
workshops, 1 with the company executives and 2 with senior project and
subcontractor managers. A series of sessions (10) were held over four
weeks to test, review, and clarify CC statements. A total of 58 MAP
Checks were completed covering Land Transport, Excavation, Hot
Works, Lifting Operations, Stored Energy and Working at Height MAE
Hazard categories. The case study team after the initial 4-week training
and testing period were able to apply CCs to the work site, analyse and
respond to CC criteria.

Not
included
Response

Response

Not
included

4.3. Step 4: Field verifications
A total of 766 MAP Checks were conducted in the 18 months of the
Pilot Study with 281 MAP (37 %) assurance reviews completed by the
project line management. The most common MAP checks were con
ducted for Land Transport and Working at Height hazards, with
Confined Space Entry being the more prevalent in the second half of the
project after the vessels and other tanks were installed on site (Fig. 5).
MAP checks were completed in the month they were planned except
where the high-risk activity did not occur due to a change in work scope
or schedule. In four instances the monthly Risk Profile was revised
during the month due to changes in work scope identified additional
high-risk activities not previously planned. Changing the Risk Profile
identified additional MAP Checks required to be conducted during the
month to verify the additional CCs relative to the new hazards as dis
cussed in Section 6.1.
MAP checks were conducted across 6 construction activities (work
scopes) with Land Transport and Lifting Operation hazards for logistics
activities (Activity 1) having the highest number of MAP checks
completed followed by Structural, Mechanical & Piping (Activity 4)
activities focusing on Lifting Operations and Working at Height hazards,
Fig. 5.
“Strike Live Services” (EXC-001) was the most common MAP check
conducted and expected given the project was adjacent to an operating
facility and located in an urban environment. “Fall of Ground” (EXC004) was used in the early months of the project where deep excavations
required ground support system and were fully compliant. Similarly
Unsafe Atmosphere in Excavation (EXC-003) was applied during the
commissioning phase of the project where gases and fumes generated
from commissioning activities had the potential to accumulate in
excavations.

Response

Explanatory

Explanatory

Explanatory
Explanatory

Explanatory
Explanatory

which MAE risks applied as a baseline to the entire project scope. During
the workshop the participants identified areas where the team were not
clear on the construction methodology, battery limits (boundaries) for
tie-ins to existing client plant and where changes in design would impact
construction sequencing. The risk profile review also enabled all par
ticipants to clarify work scope or construction and / or commissioning
requirements which were not well understood.
A total of 8 construction activities were identified with a total of 24
MAE risks associated with the project baseline scope of work (Appendix
D). Eleven months into the project an additional MAE risk, Confined
Space – Working within a Contaminated Atmosphere, was added to the
risk profile as the project started to work in sealed vessels. During the
project timeline the risk profile changed with focus on specific MAE
hazards and verifications per MAE hazard increasing and waning asso

4.4. Step 5: Monitoring
An assessment of compliance rate for MAP checks critical control
implementation was conducted for Excavation MAE hazards calculated
as:

′

Average compliance rate =

compliant CC s documented per MAE hazard for the period
× 100
number CC checked per MAE hazard for the period

8
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Fig. 4. MAP checks completed by MAE hazard category.

Fig. 5. MAP checks by activity for duration of case study.

A total of 84 hard copy excavation activity MAP checks were assessed
to check for non-compliance of the critical control when the MAP check
was conducted with an average compliance rate calculated monthly for
each of the excavation related MAE hazards (Fig. 6). Compliance rates
measured between 80 % (EXC-001) to 100 % (EXC-003 & EXC-004) with
an average compliance rate of 93 %. Overall, for excavation related high
risk activities a total of 58 (7 %) non-compliant critical controls were
identified through the MAP check process throughout the project. Data
on Stop Work Authority (SWA) due to CC non-compliance was not
captured during the study.
Further investigation is required to understand why Critical Controls
were not implemented or effective when assessed in the field.

4.5. Step 6: Lessons Learned
The project did not have any potential MAE events during the period
of the trial, however incident alerts for potential and actual MAE’s
circulated through construction associations and regulators, were
monitored by the researcher and project HSE professionals to identify is
any were applicable to the project. One event, tramming a piling rig
under power lines, was evaluated, and compared to Strike Live Services
MAE hazard and CC’s and identified a gap in the MAP model. The
research SME’s and project management and HSE professionals
reviewed the “Strike Live Services” MAE Hazard and CC’s and included
power lines into the MAP check, which was particularly relevant to the
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Fig. 6. Excavation activities - MAE’s critical control compliance rate.

Fig. 7a. Performance trends of project leading indicators.

Fig. 8b. Performance trends of project lagging indicators.
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Fig. 9a. Monthly changes in the difference of each leading variable.

Fig. 10b. Monthly changes in the difference of each lagging variable.

project which had a HV power line running on the north side of the site.
The change in MAP check was communicated to the site supervisors
and was included in the MAP checks from that point on. From identi
fication of a potential new MAE hazard to inclusion in MAP checks
occurred within seven days.

and Interventions rate (SOI_FR), MAP Check rate (MAPCH_FR), MAP
Assurance review rate (MAPAS_FR) and All Incident rate show an in
crease in mean difference in monthly values over time.
The trends in both the time plots and monthly changes in the dif
ference of each value indicate a limited number of variables can be used
to describe the safety performance data relationships as confirmed by
Principal Component Analysis (PCA). PCA identified 92.4 % of the re
lationships were described by 7 principal components (Table 6). The
statistical model was applied across all eleven variables defined in

4.6. MAP contribution to safety – relationship analysis
Time series plots (Fig 7, Fig 8) of each of the metrics identified
increasing trends in hazard reporting rate (HAZREP_FR), and personal
risk assessments (PRA_FR) over the duration of the project. The Super
visor Observation and Interventions rate (SOI_FR) and MAP check
(MAPCH_FR) rate declined over the duration of the project. Injury
related metrics (TRIF, RDIF, MTI_FR, HPI_FR, NO_TREAT_FR) showed
intermittent events with most months having a zero value.
Comparison of the difference between the monthly values for each
variable (Fig 9, Fig 10) indicates a decrease in mean difference between
values over time for personal risk assessment rate (PRA_FR) and Stop
Work Authority rate (SWA_FR). The trend for Supervisor Observation

Table 6
Principal component analysis (PCA) of safety performance series.
Standard
Deviation
Proportion of
variance
Cumulative
Proportion

11

PC1

PC2

PC3

PC4

PC5

PC6

PC7

2.13

1.60

1.26

1.12

1/07

0.99

0.93

0.32

0.18

0.11

0.09

0.08

0.07

0.06

0.324

0.507

0.621

0.710

0.792

0.862

0.924
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Table 7
Correlation matrix across performance measures.
TRIF
TRIF
ALLINC_FR
FAI_FR
MTI_FR
ALLINJ_FR
HAZREP_FR
SOI_FR
PRA_FR
SWA_FR
MAPCH_FR
MAPAS_FR

0.004
0.003
0.955
0.350
0.055
0.168
0.023
0.155
0.080
0.345

ALLINC_FR

FAI_FR

MTI_FR

ALLINJ_FR

HAZREP_FR

SOI_FR

PRA_FR

SWA_FR

MAPCH_FR

MAPAS_FR

0.004

0.003
0.250

0.955
0.016
0.063

0.350
0.284
0.670
0.407

0.055
0.179
0.409
0.162
0.031

0.168
0.144
0.401
0.255
0.094
0.645

0.023
0.064
0.585
0.140
0.093
0.840
0.713

0.155
0.016
0.077
0.127
0.062
0.251
0.432
0.207

0.080
0.034
0.410
0.185
0.093
0.857
0.789
0.857
0.465

0.345
0.066
0.528
0.451
0.143
0.586
0.490
0.612
0.024
0.530

0.250
0.016
0.284
0.179
0.144
0.064
0.016
0.034
0.066

0.063
0.670
0.409
0.401
0.585
0.077
0.410
0.528

0.408
0.162
0.255
0.140
0.127
0.185
0.451

0.031
0.094
0.093
0.062
0.093
0.143

0.645
0.840
0.251
0.857
0.586

0.713
0.432
0.789
0.490

0.207
0.857
0.612

0.465
0.024

0.530

NOTE: Bold text denotes significant correlation at p=<0.05. Red text denotes negative correlations.

Table 5, with the PCA identified the majority of the variation (92.4 %)
within the model can be attributed to seven variables. Determining the
variables and strength of the relationships between variables was
modelled through correlation analysis.
Correlation analysis (Table 7) was applied to identify variables of
interest for regression modelling of two hypotheses:

Limitations of the data set, (e.g., 18 values per measure, zero inflated
values) prevented further regression analysis.
5. Discussion
The purpose of the study was to develop a novel Major Accident
Prevention program for the construction industry adapted from CCRM
and applied using HRO principles to improve effectiveness of fatality
risk related controls and safety performance. CCRM assumes a constant
state of ‘unease’ consistent with HRO principles requiring CCs to be
proactively verified, a concept needed in the dynamic construction
environment. The development of MAP program tools considered the
complexity of construction risks and hazard management amidst the
dynamic changes which occur in construction projects. The MAP pro
gram and practical application of CC field verification which was tested
in a pilot study.
The Pilot study increased the level of ‘observation’ being undertaken
by supervisors and provided direct feedback to workers on the expec
tations of the critical control criteria. Whilst this is a desired outcome of
the verification activity, Hawthorne effects due to the novelty of the
critical control verification or performance feedback from supervisors
may also contributed to safety performance outcomes. The duration of
the study was expected to reduce the novelty factor, however further
research data and analysis of factors affecting the safety outcomes is
required. The duration of the pilot study tested the MAP program
throughout the construction phase of the water processing facility
project but finished prior to pre-commissioning which was not tested.
The MAE’s assessed did not cover all construction high-risk activities as
construction projects occur in various environments (near shore, ma
rine) and project scopes (e.g., power, infrastructure, mining and / or
hydrocarbon processing facilities). Equally the study did not assess
various cultural factors (e.g., language, religion, societal structures) and
commercial and delivery strategies (e.g., self-perform, subcontractor,
joint ventures) which impact construction project MAE risks.
Taking into consideration the limitations of the study several insights
can be drawn from this work.

i. Introduction of MAP contributes to reducing incident events
ii. Introduction of MAP contributes to frontline risk management
activities
There were seven variables with statistically significant correlations:
FAI_FR, HAZREP_FR, SOI_FR, PRA_FR, MAPCH_FR and MAPAS_FR. The
analysis identified moderate to high correlations between time series
variables:
MAP Check rate: HAZREP_FR (-0.830), SOI_FR (0.789), PRA-FR
(-0.857);
Personal Risk Assessment rate (PRA_FR): HAZREP_FR (0.840),
SOI_FR (-0.713) and MAPAS_FR (-0.613).
There were weak correlations between the time series variables:
First Aid Injury: PRA_FR (0.585), MAPAS_FR (-0.528).
The MAP Check rate positively influences (increases) the rate of
frontline risk assessment processes (HAZREP_FR, SOI_FR), however has
the inverse impact on Personal Risk Assessment (PRA_FR) rate. MAP
Check rate did not have a direct impact on injury rates. An increase in
the MAP assurance rate (MAPAS_FR) suppressed First Aid Injury rate.
The strong correlation between MTI_FR and TRIF (0.955) was ex
pected as medical treatments are a component of the TRIF measure. A
similar relationship was noted between FAI_FR and ALLINJ_FR (0.670)
as a first aid injury is a component of all jury frequency rate. Equally
conducting Personal Risk Assessments results in the identification of
hazards resulting in a strong positive correlation (0.840).
The strong positive relationship between MAP Check rate and SOI_FR
(0.857) was expected as supervisors conduct SOIs whilst undertaking
MAP Checks to reinforce the critical controls with the team involved.
There is not a direct operational relationship within the project which
would explain MAP Check positively improving hazard reports rate
(0.857), further study is required.
The FAI_FR lagging variable was selected for testing against the
leading variable except SWA_FR. All time variables were assessed for
stationarity, an assumption of time series regression modelling, using
Kwiatkowsski, Phillips, Schmidt & Shin (KPPS) test. With kpsss_pvalues
ranging from 0.0157 to 0.1 the data was non-stationary. Transformation
methods were applied to the time series data (mean differences, loga
rithm) in attempts to achieve a stationary data set for modelling, how
ever kpss_pvalues still failed.
The incident or injury related (TRIR, HPI_FR, MTI_FR, RDIF,
No_treat_FR) showed a high proportion of zero incidents in the months
with future modelling needing to take into account zero inflation as they
tend to be rare events.

5.1. Can a critical control management model be applied to construction?
The study demonstrated the MAP approach can be applied in prac
tice in construction. The steps of the MAP program outlined the process
for implementation and provided the system for the project leadership
and line supervision to apply the tools. The MAP program was adaptable
to the project lifecycle as the CC verification effort changed throughout
the project as the work scope (activities) or MAE Risk profile changed.
The MAP program introduced the use of the MAE Risk Profile to
identify and assess planned project activities as a monthly look ahead.
The MAE Risk Profile was developed to assist in the planning for highrisk task and focus management effort on CCs. The senior project
leaders through the MAE Risk Profile workshops commented on the
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efficiency, structure, and repeatability of the MAE Risk Profile to distil
the complexity of the project MAE hazards across high-risk work scopes.
The MAE Risk Profile was updated 22 times during the 18-month study
taking an average of 35 min to complete post the initial baseline session,
which was determined to be worthwhile. The outcome of the monthly
MAE Risk Profile set the requirements for verification activity on the
project. The MAE Risk Profile provided a structure to manage scope
changes, as was evident with the inclusion of new MAE risks on four
occasions. Managements’ use of the MAE Risk Profile enabled the
leaders to proactively respond to changes in construction work scope
and MAE risks throughout the project lifecycle. The use of the MAE Risk
Profile was a fundamental change in the projects risk management
effort. Further research is required to determine how the MAE Risk
Profile and content of the definitions of construction activities (Appen
dix A) and MAE risks (Appendix B) can be applied to other projects and
construction activities.
Monitoring of individual CC compliance was achieved through
verification process undertaken by supervision, which enabled the site
teams to rectify the control prior to continuing the work. However, as a
verification process and not conducted every time a high-risk task is
completed the program does not comprehensively identify all CC noncompliance which may occur on the project. The compliance rate
measured for Excavation activities remained variable for two of the four
related MAE scenarios (EXC-001 Strike Live Services, EXC-002 Collapse
of Ground) throughout the project indicating further work is required to
understand other factors (e.g., transition of work to new subcontractor
teams) which affect the desired performance.
The MAP implementation methodology included a series of
engagement sessions involving executive and senior managers, project
managers and line supervision. The executive and senior manager
workshop set the MAP principles (organisational rules) for implement
ing the MAP program within the organisation and the study project.
During the workshops, the most contentious MAP Principles was the
reallocation of the “stop work” decision from project management to
frontline supervisors. Project Managers who solely made the “stop work”
decisions previously, argued that as they understood the work schedule,
they were informed to make stop work decisions. However, executive
leaders who referred to the definition of a Critical Control, deemed that
the frontline supervision were authorised to stop work when CCs were
not implemented, or found to be ineffective.
The organisational change which delegated the frontline supervi
sor’s authority to stop work represented an organisational shift of power
to rule-orientated leadership being exercised by frontline supervision.
Hayes (2012) identified frontline supervisors with clear rules [specified
controls] delineating compliance requirements are more likely to act
[stop work] provided the actions are supported by managers, was
evident through the MAP Check records for the duration of the study.
Further work is needed to determine the degree by which the shift in
stop work authority was derived from the specification of the CCs,
increased monitoring of CCs through MAP checks and supervisor en
gagements or as the result of the increase in oversight through the
quality control MAP Reviews.
Grill and Nielsen (2019) identified in the construction industry, rule
orientated leadership has a positive effect on safety outcomes where the
workers are involved in the decision-making process. The strong positive
correlation [r = 0.789] between MAP checks and SOIs indicated su
pervisor engagement with work team members occurred when MAP
checks were being conducted. It remains unclear if the SOIs conducted
were effective in preventing incident events or raising awareness on
MAE hazards across the workforce requiring further research to explore
the correlation between MAE, SOI, and impact on safety performance.

5.2. Has MAP improved safety performance?
The Pilot Study project did not have any MAE events and no signif
icant correlation between CC verification and MAE’s events was
identified.
The high correlation between MAP Check rate and frontline risk
assessment processes (HAZOB, SOI) indicates MAP Checks contribute to
improving the rate of frontline hazard identification and control. The
confounding factor is the negative influence MAP Checks had on Per
sonal Risk Assessment (PRA_FR). PRAs are personal task-based hazard
assessment conducted by individual workers prior to commencing the
task. Verification of Critical Controls managed by a personal safety
CCRM program are common contributory factors in lower consequence
events (Bellamy 2015). By applying MAP Checks line supervisors also
verified the common controls which prevented minor injuries and
incidents.
MAP Checks are supervisor led and include interactions with their
work team to conduct verifications which potentially replaces individual
task risk assessments and reducing the rate of PRA’s being recorded. It is
unclear if the relationship between MAP_CH and PRA rates is due to
changes in the criteria for completion of PRAs on the project, limitations
due to the size of the data sample or another factor. Further research is
required to explore the MAP, existing risk programs (PRA, HAZOB, SOI)
relationship on safety performance.
The premise in developing the MAP program is through systematic
identification of MAE hazards and application of CCs with specific
‘control limits’ will result in improved risk-based decision making
within a project and reduce incidents, particularly MAEs (Grill et al.
2017). Apart from the weak correlation between first aid injuries and
MAP Assurance rate [r = -0.589] it was unclear if implementation of
MAP in the case study reduced the frequency of incident events.
Measuring construction safety performance given the decentralised
organisation structure is complex (Woolley et al. 2020) as leading in
dicators are inter-related and not always directly related to lagging in
dicators of incident or injury performance (Lingard et al. 2017; Shohet
et al. 2018). Analysis of the case study data indicated MAP verifications
improve hazard identification by increasing the rate of other frontline
risk assessments, however provided limited information on incident
prevention. Further investigation is required to explore the relationship
between MAP Checks, risk management processes and incident
prevention.
5.3. Observations to improve MAP implementation within an organization
The MAP program used multiple design principles to mitigate an
overly complex CCM program including aggregation of MAEs with same
CCs (as applied in the mining industry), evaluation of controls applying
the ICMM (2015b) control definitions, application of the monthly risk
profile and verification of CCs as an ‘audit’ not a task based activity.
The MAE Risk Profile process within the MAP program provided
detailed identification of the MAE risk exposures when planning future
works, ensuring all potential MAE exposures were identified and directly
linked to the planned high-risk activities. The MAE Risk Profile focussed
project management on MAE risks which prescribed the verification
effort and resources required to validate CC implementation and effec
tiveness. The Risk Profile process minimised the ‘randomness’ of the CC
verifications being conducted within a month and provided the orga
nisation assurance CCs for the identified MAE hazards had been
assessed. The flexibility of the Risk Profile process enabled project
management to re-assess MAE risks when project scope changed and
promptly commence CC verification for newly identified MAE hazards
as part of the assurance program.
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The effectiveness of the CCs from the sample tested identified with 7
% being non-compliant indicates further understanding of factors
affecting CC implementation and control standard when implemented is
needed.
The organisational framework within which MAP is implemented
needs to be clearly defined and agreed by senior executives of the or
ganization. The MAP Principles were developed by the organization
involved in the case study, however, may not be applied universally
across the construction industry and need to be validated and agreed
prior to any implementation. Decisions on who owns the fatality risk,
what is ALARP for the organization and how will MAP checks be applied
and recorded will be required and then communicated by executive
leaders to set up the program for success. Equally, as the risk is owned by
line management the MAP program needed to be owned and imple
mented by line managers who were accountable for the training and
application of MAP Checks and assurance activities in the field.
Major Accident Event hazards whilst defined in the MAP model need
to be reviewed against an organization’s operational risks which change
with different scopes. Similarly, the Critical Controls defined within
MAP need to be adapted to the organizational and regulatory standards
and cultural differences including language.
The case study applied limited training in the MAP program, and it
was identified an intensive program of in field coaching on the Critical
Controls and verification requirements was needed initially and then
repeated when new contractors or supervisors joined the project.
Experiential, in-field training and coaching was the most effective which
is consistent with previous research (Tezel et al. 2021). Investing in the
training and building of competency of the construction superintendents
enabled in field coaching of supervisors whilst MAP assurance reviews
were undertaken, building in efficient use of resources and improved
competency across supervisors.
Every incident involving a MAE hazard is an opportunity to test if the
Critical Controls have been implemented or were effective and if not
understand why to improve either the application or identify if the
control needs to be improved. Organizations adopting MAP would
benefit from integrating CC analysis and a review of the MAE hazard
bow tie as part of the incident investigation system and refinement of CC
requirements from the investigations.

of the standard pre-work activities reinforced using the MAE verification
as a communication tool during pre-task risk reviews to raise awareness
of the MAE hazards and the CCs.
The MAP program resulted a shift in decision making authority from
executive to front line leaders by mandating frontline leaders were fully
authorised and required to ‘stop work’ when CCs were not implemented
or effective. The shift in decision making authority together with the
comprehensive training in CC specifications increased the confidence of
frontline leaders to manage high risk activities and act to ‘stop work’ in
the absence of CCs. The organisational impact of the shift in decision
making authority was not investigated in the study, with further
research required to understand how MAP and CC ‘stop work’ impacts
safety leadership and project safety climate within a construction
organisation.
The MAP program does not operate in isolation to existing con
struction risk management processes, and in the absence of MAE events
on the pilot project was found to enhance field risk management pro
grams (i.e., hazard reporting, supervisor engagements) and has a rela
tionship in reducing first aid events. The PCA and correlation analysis
identified FAI-FR as the only lagging measure of safety performance
which was affected by the leading risk management activities of PRAs
and MAP Assurance review frequency rates. The Hazard Reporting
(HAZREP) frequency rate was most sensitive of the leading measures
with effects identified across SOIs, PRAs, MAP checks and MAP Assur
ance activities. The inter-relationship between MAP and other risk
management programs used in construction organisations was both
positive and perplexing as MAP contributed to higher frequency of some
activities but depressed the use of personal risk assessments by work
team members.
The MAP program will benefit construction organisation willing to
adopt a CCRM approach to managing fatality risks. The MAE risk
profiling process efficiently review high risk work and is supported by
practical application through field verification of CCs. Further under
standing is required on the human factors affecting CC reliability and
how the MAE model will respond to changing construction methodol
ogies? Equally getting the CC’s ‘right’ and the relationship the MAP
program has on safety performance and performance of existing risk
management processes needs further study. Acknowledgements.
The authors would like to express thanks to the construction com
pany providing access to the pilot project for this research.
This research was supported by an Australian Government Research
Training Program (RTP) Scholarship.

6. Conclusion
The Major Accident Prevention (MAP) program is an alternative risk
based Critical Control Risk Management (CCRM) model and imple
mentation methodology. It was shown to effectively manage construc
tion MAE hazards through rules-based critical control management
applied using high reliability organisational principles.
The MAE risk profiling process MAP adapted well to the dynamic
construction environment and provided a practical platform to update
MAE risks and management of Critical Control (CC) field verifications.
The MAP program provided a practical solution to manage a complex
interface of high-risk tasks by limiting the number of controls and
improving the specificity of control statements. The process of defining
CCs for each MAE hazard reduced the overall number and complexity of
controls front line leaders needed to focus their attention on.
The specificity of the CC statements aided front line leaders and
supervisors to quickly assess if the CC was implemented as designed and
within control tolerance limits. This resulted in the efficient assessment
of CCs for high-risk tasks across multiple MAE hazards.
Supervisors were able to plan and prepare for high-risk work as part
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Appendix A. Construction activities and definitions
Activity

Definition (activity scope)

Activity 1: Logistics – personnel / materials / equipment

Movement of personnel, materials, equipment and supplies to, from and around Company and non-Company sites for
business purposes
Design and construction and setup of commercial, industrial, residential or office buildings including site preparation;
power, water, sewage or communication services; industrial fit-outs (cranes, exhaust systems, machinery).
Design, construction, site preparation, installation and completion of bulk earthworks for facilities, structures and linear
infrastructure including MOF facilities; roads, pavement, rail, power/coms transmission infrastructure.
Design, construction and installation of facilities and structures including process systems, storage tanks, stick build
structures, machinery, communications towers. Includes Structural, Mechanical and Piping activities related to Hook-up,
Operations & Maintenance tasks.
Installation and fit out of communications, instrumentation and control systems in a building, plant or facility. Includes
Electrical, Communication and Instrument Installation activities related to Hook-up, Operations & Maintenance tasks.
Design, construction, installation of pipelines including buried, surface laid and suspended/elevated pipes.
Design, construction, installation and fit-out of jetties and MOFs, including bulk earthworks, in or immediately adjacent to
any waterway.
Fabrication, casting and manufacture in Company and non-Company locations including international suppliers
including access to from and around that facility. Includes Fabrication activities related to Hook-up, Operations &
Maintenance tasks.
A tunnel or underground excavation including the construction of shafts, risers, drives, stopes, material passes and cut and
cover excavations. Includes use of tunnel boring, airleg, shaft boring and mechanised mining methodologies.
Process Functional Testing, Fire & Gas Testing, ESD Testing, Mechanical running, High Pressure Leak Testing, Inerting
with N2, Catalyst Loading, Introduction of Fuel Gas, Commissioning Utilities, Commissioning Flare, Compressor runs on
Nitrogen or possibly air. Energizing equipment.
Survey and inspection services requiring access to supplier facilities, inspection and testing at non-Clough and
international locations; access to remote locations and activities where a Clough person is required to work alone.
Includes Survey / Inspection activities related to Operations & Maintenance tasks.
The felling, clearing, hauling (skidding), sawmilling, loading and transport of timber including use of chainsaws, cherry
pickers, dozer chains, explosives as methods to fell trees.

Activity 2 - Site Establishment / Demobilisation
Activity 3 - Earthworks / siteworks / road / rail
Activity 4 - Structural, Mechanical, Piping (Including
tanks)
Activity 5 - Electrical, Communication, Instrument
Installation
Activity 6 - Pipelines construction - (onshore / offshore)
Activity 7 - Jetty / MOF Installation - including piling /
dredging / marine works
Activity 8 - Fabrication
Activity 9 - Tunnelling / Underground excavation
Activity 10 - Pre-commissioning / Commissioning
Activity 11 - Survey / Inspection Services
Activity 12 - Forestry

Appendix B:
Summary of fatality related Major Accident Event (MAE) categories and MAE hazard scenarios.

MAE Category

MAE Scenarios

Use of Air Transport
Working in a Confined Space

Travel using air transport – crash from flying in a fixed wing / helicopter event, fall from, depressurisation, medical or security event during travel.
Working in a confined space – insufficient oxygen, fumes / gas stored within a confined space, gasses entrained in fluids (H2s), work generating
gasses (e.g., painting, welding fumes), hot work causing fire / explosion, hypo / hyperthermia
Working within a contaminated atmosphere – working with a dedicated air supply in known toxic or oxygen deficient atmosphere in confined space.
Striking a live service – gas / power / hydraulic pipe or cable during excavation or penetration activities, striking overhead power lines or other
services
Collapse of ground – into / around excavation inundating workers (soil, slope, groundwater, flooding, erosion)
Unsafe atmosphere in excavation – use of chemicals, hydrocarbons generating fumes or reactive gas generating ground (e.g., H2S).
Unplanned detonation of explosives – during use, transport, storage or handling
Hot work – thermal cutting, welding, grinding, heating with an open flame
Hot work in potential explosive atmosphere – flammable process / hydrocarbon storage, venting or other release
Loss of containment of Flammable Substances – during use, transport, transfer, storage or handling
Loss of containment of hazardous substances – during transport and storage of bulk / containerised hazardous substances via leaks, collision, or
corrosion of vessels, loading / unloading or overfilling
Handling and use of hazardous substances – contract through skin, or inhalation of toxic gases / fumes.
Vehicle component failure whilst driving on site / off site – loss of steering, brakes, wheel / tyre failure
Loss of control of vehicle – driver error leading to vehicle collision, rollover or other accident on site / off site: fatigue, under influence of alcohol or
drugs, concentration lapse, speeding, unfamiliar road rules / customs / vehicle type, driver medical event.
Unsecured loads – loads fall during loading, transport, unloading
Driving on site – heavy vehicle / light vehicle / pedestrian / fixed equipment collisions, site conditions leading to collision or rollover, uncontrolled
release of high tyre pressures, vehicle tyre fires, adverse weather
Crane / lifting device instability – load / centre of gravity shifts, over capacity / range, failure of ground or supporting infrastructure, marine vessel
instability, strong winds.
Lift contact with structure / asset / powerline / live services – load or crane snagging or striking ancillary equipment, services, structures, or
buildings.
Moving / swinging loads – swinging loads or moving crane parts contacting personnel involved in the lift, including lifts to / from an unstable vessel.
Dropped load – dropped load, loose objects, debris or falling parts.
Working over water – personnel working near open edges, working on temporary / fixed platforms over water
Drop / Fall from Personnel Transfer basket – use of lifting device / crane suspended transfer baskets with potential for basked to be dropped,
personnel fall from or trapped under transfer basket.
Marine personnel transfer failure – vessel to vessel, use of tender / crew boat, vessel to /from shore, structure, or jetty; gangway transfers
Vessel collision / grounding – multiple vessel operations in same area; use of tender vessels for transfers or mooring operations; civilian or other
vessel interaction when operating or in transit; grounding or vessel collision with submerged or surface structure, drifting / mooring / propulsion
failure

Excavating or Penetrating a
Surface
Fire and / or Explosion

Hazardous Substances
Use of Land Transport

Lifting Operations

Marine Operations

(continued on next page)
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(continued )
MAE Category

Stored Energy

Working at Height

MAE Scenarios
Vessel instability / taking on water – watertight integrity failure’ vessel ballast / stability system failure; vessel overload / tippling, jack up barge
lifting failure
Mooring line / anchor handline failure – personnel struck / caught by mooring line or anchor during mooring operations.
Divers in the water – dropped objects, air supply restriction / contamination, attack by shark / crocodile, diving ‘bends’ hazards.
Uncontrolled electrical energy release
Uncontrolled release from Pressurised Systems: personnel struck by debris, concussed by uncontrolled release of pressurised fluids / gases
pressurised within tanks, pipes (temporary or permanent)
Uncontrolled release of Physical energy from structure / equipment – personnel struck by, entangled within a structure / equipment from
uncontrolled release of physical energy from structural failure / demolition, tension in lines and pipes, from push/pull/twisting/ expansion energies
Uncontrolled release of mechanical energy from equipment - personnel struck by, entangled within a structure / equipment from uncontrolled
release of mechanical energy including springs, fly wheels, pistons, motors, conveyors, rotating parts and tools.
Manual tree felling – manual felling of trees / cutting of logs, falling trees, limbs or debris; deadfall; rolling / falling logs on the ground; struck by
chainsaw blade.
Fall through or from a platform or structure – grating, work platform, floor / roof access, manhole, voids, wharves / jetties, natural rock faces.
Fall down – access and egress from fixed and mobile plant / vessels, stairs / ladders / unstable ground.
Fall from scaffold – erection / dismantling of scaffolding, working from scaffold, scaffold collapse.
Fall from mobile work platform – failure of / fall out of EWP, scissor lift, temporary mobile platform
Working from man cage – man cage drops, or personnel fall out of man cage / work basket.
Fall from height during rope access activities
Dropped objects – dropped tools / materials whilst working at height.

Appendix C
Case Study - Mobile Equipment Bowtie Analysis.
Appendix D
MAP Risk Profile – Case Study Example.
Appendix E
MAP Checklist Highlighting Design Features.
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